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TWENTY-FIVE years ago, cooperative apartment buildings were uncom-
mon in the United States, and condominiums were virtually nonexistent.
Since then, however, both forms, and particularly condominiums, have
spread rapidly through the real estate market. This article explores the
factors responsible for this development. In the process, it also assesses
the relative transactional efficiency of consumer ownership and investor
ownership in multiunit housing.
I argue that two factors appear principally responsible for the recent
spread of cooperatives and condominiums. First is the large tax subsidy
to owner-occupied housing that has existed since the Second World War
and that has been particularly large during the past two decades. Second
is innovation in the forms available for organizing ownership in multiunit
dwellings. A variety of considerations suggest that the first of these fac-
tors has been more important than the second and that, in the absence
of the tax subsidy, cooperatives and condominiums would occupy a much
smaller share of the housing market than they do at present. In support
of this analysis, this article offers the first sophisticated calculations of
the magnitude of the pure tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing, as
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opposed to rental housing, and of the changes in that subsidy over the
past fifty years.
Section II briefly surveys the essential characteristics and recent evolu-
tion of housing cooperatives and condominiums. Section III analyzes the
principal factors governing the transactional efficiency of cooperatives
and condominiums as opposed to rental housing. Section IV discusses
the tax treatment of cooperatives and condominiums and provides quanti-
tative estimates of the net tax subsidy to these forms at different points
over the past fifty years. Section V considers the influence of rent control,
increasing liquidity of apartment residents, and mortgage insurance on
the temporal evolution of cooperatives and condominiums. Section VI
assesses the significance of organizational innovation in the forms of ten-
ure for multiunit buildings. Section VII examines the conspicuous paucity
of commercial cooperatives and condominiums. Section VIII explores
implications for organizational efficiency and tax policy, and Section IX
concludes.
Today the condominium form has spread to a number of different con-
figurations of housing construction and occupancy, including time-shared
resort lodging and groups of detached single-family dwellings sharing
common amenities. In the discussion here, however, primary attention
will be given to multiunit apartment buildings, which were the original
focus for cooperative and condominium housing and which remain the
context in which these forms are principally employed.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATION AND EVOLUTION OF HOUSING
COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS
In a housing cooperative, the occupants of the building lease their
individual units. The arrangement is distinguished from an ordinary land-
lord-tenant relationship by the fact that the tenants collectively own the
building by holding shares in a corporation that has title to the property.
Thus, the tenants are collectively their own landlord. In a condominium,
in contrast, the occupants each own the individual units they occupy.
There remains an element of collective ownership in the condominium,
but it is confined to the common elements of the property such as the
hallways, elevators, exterior shell, roof, and grounds.
One consequence of this distinction is that mortgage financing in a
cooperative is generally obtained collectively by the cooperative corpora-
tion with a single blanket mortgage for the building as a whole, while in
a condominium each unit owner obtains his own mortgage financing with
only his individual unit pledged as security. In most other essential opera-
tional respects, the two forms are not notably different. In particular, the
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lease in a typical cooperative is a "proprietary lease" entitling the lessee
to perpetual occupany of the unit. The lease, and the associated shares
of stock in the cooperative corporation, can be sold by the lessee at
whatever price the market will bring. Thus a member of a cooperative,
like the owner of a condominium, effectively has a perpetual, exclusive,
and freely transferable' property right in the physical unit he occupies.
The term "owner-occupancy" will therefore be used here to encompass
both forms.
In the United States, cooperatives long antedate condominiums. New
York City's first cooperative apartment building, and perhaps the first in
the United States, was built in 1876;2 by 1929 the city contained at least
125 cooperative apartment buildings, most of which were luxury build-
ings.3 Cooperative apartments also spread to other American cities during
this period;4 Chicago, for example, had over 100 cooperative apartment
buildings by 1930.'
There are no accurate figures on the numbers of cooperatives in exis-
tence between 1930 and 1975. However, an estimate for 1960, which
may be generous, suggests that there may have been as many as 150,000
cooperative units in existence then, amounting to roughly 1 percent of
all multifamily dwellings; about one-third of these units were in New
York City. 6 Table 1 gives total housing stock data for cooperatives since
1975, when systematic data first became available; as shown there, the
' Subject, however, to approval by the managing board in the case of a cooperative. See
note 15 infra.
2 Cooperative Homes Old to Manhattan, New York Times, January 27, 1929, sec. 12, at
1, col. 8. At least thirty more cooperative apartment buildings appear to have been con-
structed in New York City before the First World War. Id.; New York Times, February
10, 1907, at 16, col. 5; New York Times, April 25, 1909, sec. 7, at 2, col. 1.
Twentieth Century Fund, American Housing: Problems and Prospects 233 (1944); New
York Times, January 25, 1929, sec. 12, at 1, col. 6. By the 1920s there were also some lower-
and middle-income cooperative apartment buildings, a number of which were sponsored by
unions. Burr Henly, Financing Housing Cooperatives 71-84 (unpublished master's thesis,
Univ. Washington, 1982). Low-income cooperatives still exist; their principal role, how-
ever, is to assure that housing subsidies are passed through to tenants; absent subsidies
they would probably be rare.
4 Otis Castle, Legal Phases of Cooperative Buildings, 2 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1928); Twenti-
eth Century Fund, supra note 3.
5 Chester McCullough, Cooperative Apartments in Illinois, 26 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 303,
305 (1948).
6 Foundation for Cooperative Housing, Cooperative Development with Federal Assis-
tance, in Housing-the Cooperative Way 226 (Jerome Liblit ed. 1964); International Labor
Office (Geneva), Housing Cooperatives 108 (1964). There were 13.8 million multifamily
housing units in 1960. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1988, at 688, table 1221 (1987).
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TABLE I
COMPOSITION OF MULTIFAMILY HOUSING STOCK, 1975-83 (in Thousands of Units)
Total % Co-op
Multifamily Rental Co-op % Co-op Condo % Condo and Condo
1975 17,572 16,704 361 2.1 597 2.9 4.9
1976 18,022 16,983 405 2.2 634 3.5 5.8
1977 18,625 17,616 344 1.8 665 3.6 5.4
1978 19,162 17,949 348 1.8 865 4.5 6.3
1979 19,407 18,099 341 1.8 967 5.0 6.7
1980 19,672 18,269 313 1.6 1,090 5.5 7.1
1981 20,641 18,961 409 2.0 1,271 6.2 8.1
1983 21,331 19,582 360 1.7 1,389 6.5 8.2
SOURCE.-U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Annual Housing Survey: 1983, Part A,
General Housing Characteristics (Current Housing Reports ser. H-150-83 (1984)).
market share of cooperatives evidently reached its peak in 1976, when
cooperatives accounted for 2.2 percent of all multiunit housing.
As Table 1 also shows, in the 1970s the condominium form replaced the
cooperative as the preferred device for owner-occupancy of apartment
buildings in most of the country. New York City is the only significant
jurisdiction where new cooperatives have remained an important part of
the market.7
Prior to 1961, no American state had enacted enabling legislation for
housing condominiums. For this reason, and because condominiums
were quite awkward (though not impossible) to fashion with the devices
of common-law conveyancing, almost no condominium housing was cre-
ated in the United States before then. Between 1961 and 1963, however,
thirty-four states enacted enabling statutes for housing condominiums,
and by 1967 all but one state had followed suit.8 We shall return to Section
V to consider the circumstances surrounding these enactments.
Large-scale formation of condominiums did not immediately follow
enactment of the statutes. In fact, relatively few condominium units were
created prior to 1970. After that, however, condominiums began to be
formed at an accelerating pace-both by new construction and by con-
version from rental units-and quickly came to represent a substantial
portion of the housing market. Table 2 gives data on the rate of conver-
sion from rental to condominiums and cooperatives in the 1970s, while
Table 3 gives data on the rate of new construction, (Although the figures
7 Dep't of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), The Conversion of Rental Housing
to Condominiums and Cooperatives, app. 1, pt. 111, at 17, table IV-2 app. (1980).
8 Alberto Ferrer & Karl Stecher, Law of Condominium 129-33 (1967).
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TABLE 2
CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE CONVERSIONS, 1970-79
1970-75 1976 1977 1978 1979*
Total units 88,746 19,976 45,445 81,504 115,143
Condominiums 85,540 19,452 43,464 75,632 108,620
Cooperatives 3,206 524 1,981 5,872 6,523
SOURCE.-U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Conversion of Rental Housing to Condo-
miniums and Cooperatives: Volume of Conversion Activity in Selected Metropolitan Areas 4 (1981).
* Represents only first three quarters of 1979.
TABLE 3
NEW CONSTRUCTION OF CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE HOUSING UNITS IN MULTIUNIT
BUILDINGS, 1973-86 (in Thousands of Units)
Ratio of Condo
Total Condo and and Co-op Units
Multifamily Co-op Units to Total Units
1973 913 172 .19
1974 450 130 .29
1975 268 45 .17
1976 375 64 .17
1977 536 77 .14
1978 587 114 .19
1979 551 156 .28
1980 441 150 .34
1981 379 145 .38
1982 400 130 .32
1983 635 199 .31
1984 665 194 .29
1985 762 146 .19
1986 626 134 .21
SOURCE.-U.S. Dep't of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1988, at 683, table 1209
(1987).
in Table 3 combine condominiums and cooperatives, it is likely that the
ratio of the two forms approximates that which appears in Table
2-which is to say that the rate of formation of condomiums clearly
dominated that of cooperatives.) Moreover, the spread of the condomin-
ium form has been nationwide; it now plays an important role in all large
metropolitan areas. 9 As Table 1 shows, cooperatives and condominiums
combined accounted for 8.2 percent of all multifamily housing in 1983,
9 See HUD, supra note 7, app. I.
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compared to the market share of roughly 1 percent occupied by coopera-
tives in 1960.
III. THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP
Tenure choice in multiunit apartment buildings involves a choice be-
tween two different means of transacting for the same housing services:
rental (a form of market contracting) on the one hand and ownership (a
form of vertical integration) through the cooperative or condominium
form on the other. Both methods for organizing transactions are costly.
The most efficient form is simply the one that is least costly. We shall
survey here some of the most important costs of these respective forms.
A. Costs of the Rental Relationship
The costs of market contracting typically derive from the absence of
full information or effective competition. These costs can sometimes be
reduced by combining the seller and purchaser under integrated owner-
ship and therefore removing their incentive to exploit market imperfec-
tions. Where, as in the case of housing, individuals and households are
the purchasers, it is infeasible and illegal for the sellers to own the pur-
chasers; consequently, vertical integration requires that purchasers own
sellers. And where many purchasers are served by one seller, as in the
case of an apartment building, this requires in turn that the purchasers
act collectively through a cooperative.
There are three particular sources of costs in market transactions that
commonly provide the incentive for forming consumer cooperatives: mar-
ket power, lock-in, and moral hazard.'" These are also the most likely
sources of costs in apartment rentals. We shall consider them here in
turn.
1. Simple Market Power
Although simple market power, in the sense of fewness of competing
sellers, is quite commonly the impetus for consumer ownership of enter-
prise," it does not seem plausible as a motivation for the formation of
housing cooperatives and condominiums. In urban areas of sufficient den-
sity to have multiunit apartment buildings, there are generally large num-
bers of reasonably fungible apartments under diverse ownership, making
the market for apartments quite competitive.
0 See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. L. Econ. & Org. 267 (1988).
Rural electric and telephone utilities, as well as numerous wholesale and supply firms,
are commonly organized as consumer cooperatives. See Hansmann, supra note 10.
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2. Market Power Deriving from Exclusivity of the Tenant Population
There is, however, a more subtle form of market power for landlords
that derives, not from the uniqueness of the apartments, but from the
uniqueness of the tenants who occupy them.
A landlord who secures a group of tenants who are attractive neighbors
can charge more for apartments than he could otherwise. For most
classes of tenants, competition among landlords should insure that any
such increase in rental is roughly equal to the landlord's costs in selecting
tenants. However, in the case of buildings serving social elites such as
the prominent rich, a landlord may be in a position to extract pure profits
from having a select clientele: such tenants commonly place a substantial
premium on having neighbors of high status and may be too few in num-
ber to induce a competitive supply of buildings. Moreover, a landlord
will often have an incentive to establish a less exclusive clientele than
the occupants of the building would choose for themselves. In such cir-
cumstances, tenants may be able to improve their welfare considerably
by owning the building themselves. 2
This consideration may help explain why, among the well-to-do, social
exclusivity has long been considered an important reason for living in
a cooperative apartment building, 3 and it may have been a significant
inducement for the (limited amount of) cooperative housing created prior
to the Second World War.' 4 However, it is probably an unimportant
factor in most cooperative and, particularly, condominium housing today.
The market for such housing now extends well beyond social elites.
Moreover, condominiums, in contrast to cooperatives, generally do not
screen prospective unit owners on social criteria. 5
2 See Henry Hansmann, A Theory of Status Organizations, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. 119
(1986).
13 j. V. Henderson & Y. M. Ioannides, A Model of Housing Tenure Choice, 73 Am.
Econ. Rev. 98 (1983), offer a countervailing theory, arguing that, ceteris paribus, an increase
in an individual's wealth will decrease the likelihood that he will be an owner-occupant. As
they note, this result is at odds with observed patterns of tenure choice. One reason,
perhaps, is that their conclusion depends entirely on their definition of an "increase in
wealth," which involves an increase in exogenous income in each future period that is of
equal present value, hence increasing demand for consumption without increasing the need
for saving. But increases in wealth taking this form are rare.
14 The ability to choose one's fellow tenants was commonly mentioned in ads and articles
concerning cooperatives during this period. See, for example, Cooperative Homes, supra
note 2, New York Times, January 3, 1926, sec. 10, at 4, col. 7 ("In many instances the
[cooperator's] controlling motive is the desire to escape from undesirable neighborhood
conditions and to associate and identify himself with conservative surroundings and with
people of his own class").
'5 It seems to be the conventional view that one reason for choosing the cooperative over
the condominium form today is that the former provides the occupants of a building with
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3. Lock-In
Although the market for apartment rentals may be competitive when
an individual is looking for a new apartment, the situation changes after
the individual has signed a lease and moved in. The value of the transac-
tion-specific investments that the tenant makes at this time (that is, the
costs to the tenant of changing residences again) may be subject to expro-
priation by the landlord through a rent increase at the time the lease is
renewed, when the tenant is to some degree locked in. Conversely, if the
tenant decides not to renew the lease, the landlord may incur substantial
costs, including the expenses of refurbishing the apartment, advertising
it, and forgoing rent while awaiting a new tenant. 16 Thus both the landlord
or the tenant may have a degree of ex post market power after the initial
lease has been entered into. Such a bilateral monopoly, and any costly
haggling or unpredictability in rent levels that it might engender, can
presumably be avoided where tenants own the building they occupy.'
7
The available data indicate that landlords typically charge renewing
tenants roughly the same rental 8 that new tenants are charged for similar
the opportunity to be discriminating when screening new applicants for membership. The
usual arrangement in a cooperative is that, subject to the requirements of fair housing
legislation, the board of directors may reject any applicant without having to state a reason,
thus barring a tenant from assigning his lease until a tenant acceptable to the board is found.
In a condominium, in contrast, the board is typically empowered to prevent a sale only by
buying the unit itself at the contract price, and condominium boards seldom screen tenants
on social criteria. See Michael Hinds, When a Co-op Board Rejects a Buyer, New York
Times, November 2, 1986, sec. 8, at I, col. 2.
However, there are no legal obstacles to giving a condominium board screening powers
equivalent to those generally exercised by cooperative boards. That the cooperative form
'is more commonly used for purposes of personal discrimination perhaps stems from the fact
that the members of a cooperative have a strong incentive to screen prospective members to
insure that they will carry their share of the collective mortgage on the building-something
that condominiums, with their smaller degree of joint financial commitment, have less need
for. This financial screening provides a convenient opportunity and cover for engaging in
nonfinancial screening as well.
16 The initial lease term also provides the landlord with information as to whether the
tenant is a good tenant in the sense that he is nondestructive, prompt in payment, and
generally cooperative.
17 Williamson has long emphasized the importance of such transaction-specific invest-
ments in explaining vertical integration in other contexts. See Oliver Williamson, The Eco-
nomic Institutions of Capitalism 61-63 (1985).
18 J. Luis Gausch & Robert Marshall, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Length
of Residency Discount in the Rental Housing Market, 22 J. Urb. Econ. 291 (1987). Earlier
studies, whose methodology is criticized by Gausch and Marshall, had found evidence of
discounts for renewing tenants. Allen Goodman & Masahiro Kawai, Length-of-Residence
Discounts and Rental Housing Demand: Theory and Evidence, 61 Land Econ. 93 (1985);
William Clark & Allen Heskin, The Impact of Rent Control on Tenure Discounts and
Residential Mobility, 58 Land Econ. 109 (1982). If length-of residence discounts are in fact
given, they might be interpreted not as reflecting the direct costs to a landlord of finding a
new tenant but rather as an inducement that landlords give to tenants who have revealed
themselves during the initial lease term to be good tenants. See Gausch & Marshall supra.
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units, suggesting that on average the tenant's ex post market power is at
least equal to the landlord's. This in turn suggests, though it does not
clearly establish, that the transaction costs associated with bilateral mo-
nopoly in rentals are too small to provide a significant incentive for occu-
pant ownership.
4. Moral Hazard
In a complex long-term transaction such as leasing residential space,
the high cost of writing and enforcing contractual provisions that cover
all contingencies gives rise to the prospect of moral hazard. Tenants have
an incentive to underinvest in maintenance whose benefits will extend
beyond the tenant's expected tenure, while landlords have an incentive
to underinvest in improvements (such as rapid repairs) whose benefits
will be experienced primarily by a current tenant. Occupant ownership
can avoid such incentive problems.
The costs resulting from moral hazard may be significant when single-
family detached houses are rented and presumably help explain the high
proportion of owner-occupancy (85 percent) 9 among such dwellings.2" It
seems likely, however, that these costs are much smaller (in relative
terms) in rented apartment units. In the latter, the most important sys-
tems requiring long-term investments, such as the exterior shell and the
utility systems, are not under the tenant's control and thus not subject
to the underinvestment problem. The apartment units themselves gener-
ally do not require substantial maintenance by the tenant. Few residential
tenants desire substantial physical alterations to the unit they oc-
cupy even when such alterations are feasible; those who do can seek to
negotiate them separately with the landlord. Security deposits further
limit the tenant's incentive to underinvest. In turn, the landlord's in-
centive to behave opportunistically will be constrained by the advan-
tage of having a good reputation when seeking lease renewals and new
rentals.
B. Costs of Occupant Ownership
If cooperatives and condominiums involved no significant costs that
are not experienced in rental relationships, then the costs of market con-
19 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Housing Survey: 1985, ser. H-150, table 2-1.
20 See Henderson & Ioannides, supra note 13, where it is suggested that, absent problems
of risk bearing, this "fundamental rental externality" (as the authors term it) makes owner-
ship more efficient than rental for all households. The authors suggest that risk-bearing
considerations are the principal countervailing factor that induces individuals to rent rather
than own. They do not deal with the problems of collective ownership, or with the tax
subsidies, that are the principal focus here.
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tracting just surveyed, even if relatively modest, would tend to make
rental inferior to occupant ownership as a form of tenure. However,
occupant ownership also has its unique costs.
1. Collective Decision Making
A potentially significant source of costs in residential cooperatives and
condominiums, though one that is not often discussed, lies in the collec-
tive decision-making mechanisms that these forms require.
a) Inefficient Decisions. If the interests of all members of the cooper-
ative or condominium were identical, the decisions they made collec-
tively would presumably be efficient.2 In fact, however, their interests
often diverge substantially. For one thing, members vary in their prefer-
ences: some will be satisfied with wood-grained vinyl for the elevator
walls, while others will strongly prefer spending what is necessary to
have real wood; some will want better laundry facilities in the basement,
while those who take their laundry out or have their own machines will
not. In addition, interests will diverge because the members' apartments
differ in structure or location: those on the ground floor may be less eager
than those on the top floor to refurbish the elevators. As a consequence,
there will be substantial room for outcomes that do not maximize the
aggregate surplus of the occupants. This might occur, for example, when
the preferences of the median member are different from those of the
mean, or when an unrepresentative coalition achieves dominance in col-
lective decisions because their opportunity cost of time is low or because
they are otherwise strategically positioned to dominate the decision-mak-
ing process.
22
In contrast, the landlord of a rental building, in making decisions that
affect the occupants of the building as a group, generally has an incentive
to select policies that are efficient since that will maximize the aggregate
rents she can charge. 23 Moreover, the landlord, in contrast to the owner-
occupants of a cooperative or condominium, is generally free to choose
2 If their interests were completely homogeneous, then each unit owner in a cooperative
or condominium with n units would pay I/n of the cost of maintaining the common facilities
and receive l/n of the resulting benefits. Consequently, each unit owner would have an
incentive to support a collectively efficient level of maintenance.
22 If exit from a cooperative or condominium were costless, then of course market forces
would constrain such costs. But, as noted above in the discussion of lock-in, exit is often
costly.
23 To be sure, this may not be the case if the landlord cannot discriminate freely among
his tenants in the rents he charges. In that case, he will have an incentive to choose policies
that are attuned to the preferences of the marginal tenant, and this will be inefficient if the
marginal tenant's preferences differ from those of the average tenant. See A. Michael
Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell J. Econ. 417 (1975).
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efficient outcomes since she contracts separately with each individual
occupant, thus depriving them of the special opportunity that a voting
mechanism gives them to act strategically. In short, market contracting
is likely to be more efficient than voting in aggregating the preferences
of a building's occupants.
b) Transaction Costs of Decision Making. Quite aside from the effi-
ciency of the decisions ultimately made, there may be substantial transac-
tion costs associated with the process of making collective decisions in
a cooperative or condominium, such as the time that the occupants de-
vote to meetings and other governance activities.24 A single individual
acting as landlord can presumably collect information and make decisions
with less expenditure of effort.25
Moreover, the costs of collective decision making in a cooperative or
condominium may be high even in comparison with collective ownership
of the same building by a group of nonresident investors acting through
a partnership or corporation. To be sure, the members of a cooperative
or condominium have some distinct advantages in decision making that
nonresident investor-owners lack. The members commonly occupy the
building for a number of years and devote a substantial portion of their
income to it; consequently, they have both the incentive and the opportu-
nity to invest in information about the building. Moreover, much relevant
information about the building is likely to come to the members without
extra effort simply because they live there. And, because the members
all reside in close proximity to each other, meetings are easy to arrange.
In contrast, owners who are merely investors and not occupants will
generally be located far from the building and from each other and, conse-
quently, will be in a less advantageous position to exercise effective over-
sight or make collective decisions. Further, the investors' alternative is
to delegate decision-making responsibility to a manager whom they will
also have difficulty monitoring and who, lacking full ownership, will have
interests that diverge from those of the investors.
On the other hand, investors differ from owner-occupants in having
highly homogeneous interests. As a consequence, rental buildings, even
when owned collectively by a numerous group of investors, may be
spared the high transaction costs of decision making, as well as the poten-
24 See Richard Lyons, More Co-op Owners Battling Their Boards, New York Times,
April 24, 1988 (emphasizing problem of lack of expertise among co-op board members). On
the other hand, for some building occupants-particularly retirees-participation in gover-
nance may itself be a consumption good and on balance a source of benefits rather than
costs.
25 On the other hand, the process of information gathering and decision making by an
individual landlord is not costless. For example, a landlord must still negotiate separately
with each tenant, and there may often be room for strategic behavior in those negotiations.
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tially inefficient outcomes, that cooperatives and condominiums incur
as a consequence of conflicts in preferences and interests among their
members.2 6 And these savings may outweigh the economies that owner-
occupants experience in gathering information and communicating with
each other.
27
c) How Costly Is Collective Decision Making? Although it is difficult
to obtain direct empirical observations on the costs of collective decision-
making, 28 substantial anecdotal and case-law evidence suggests that con-
flicts among members are, indeed, a serious problem in the governance of
cooperatives and condominiums 29 and that homogeneity of membership is
an important aid to viability.3" Moreover, the success or failure of cooper-
ative enterprise in a variety of industries other than housing seems
strongly correlated with the degree of homogeneity of interest among the
members.31
26 One reason for this is that investors in a firm, unlike members of a condominium or a
cooperative, have a part interest in the undivided whole, with the result that they are all
affected in the same way by any decision taken by the firm. Another reason is that, because
the returns to investors are financial rather than in kind, there is little room for divergence
of preferences concerning outcomes; the investors in general all have an interest in maximiz-
ing the net present value of the firm. To be sure, members may diverge on such issues as
retention versus payout of earnings depending on their liquidity and tax status. But even
these differences are likely to be minimal since investors can select firms with financial
policies that match their particular situation.
27 To see this trade-off more clearly, imagine two identical apartment buildings. Rather
than organizing both buildings as cooperatives or condominiums, it might be more efficient
to organize them both on a conventional rental basis and have the occupants of one building
collectively own the other building through a corporation in which they invest. The nature
of the occupants' investments will be similar either way, but the latter arrangement may
involve lower costs of governance.
2 Striking indirect evidence of these costs can be found, however, in the extreme diffi-
culty in organizing multiple owners of drilling rights in a common oil pool to act collectively,
even when the potential efficiency gains are very large and the number of owners is rela-
tively small. See Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the
Common Pool, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 87 (1984).
29 See, for example, Iver Peterson, Budget Battles in Co-ops and Condos, New York
Times, January 15, 1989, sec. 10, at 1, col. 4; Ira Robbins, Methods of Holding Residential
Property, 190 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 109, I1 (1937); Thiess v. Island House
Assoc., 311 S.2d 142 (1975); Kaye v. Mount La Jolla Homeowners Assoc., 252 Cal. Rptr.
67 (1988). The much higher rate of owner-occupancy in single-family dwellings rather than
in apartments may also reflect in part the relative absence of the costs of collective decision
making in the former.
30 See, for example, testimony of Drayton Bryant, Hearings before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., in H.R. 6618
and H.R. 6742 (superseded by H.R. 7402), January 30-February 14, 1950, at 119: "[Viery
definitely ... the most successful cooperatives have been either in a socially homogeneous
group like a union or veteran group or even a church group."
" See Hansmann, supra note 10, for examples and further discussion.
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2. Liquidity
A further liability of owner-occupied housing in general, and of cooper-
ative and condominium housing in particular, is that liquidity constraints
may make it costly or impossible for potential owner-occupants to obtain
the necessary capital. Although housing provides good security for debt
financing, it does not provide perfect security, and there consequently
remain substantial agency costs associated with borrowing.32 These costs
will be reflected in high mortgage interest rates for some owner-occupants
or even in the complete unavailability of adequate loans.
On the other hand, we should not draw too strong a distinction between
rental and owner-occupancy in this regard. In a sense, a landlord is sim-
ply a lender who lends to the tenant the physical unit itself rather than
the funds necessary to purchase it. In either case, repossession is the
remedy for default on the periodic payments. The principal difference is
that the landlord, in contrast to the mortgage lender, specializes in loans
for a particular building and combines the act of lending with the provi-
sion of other services to the occupants of the units.
3. Risk Bearing
Risk bearing is a related problem. Because, for most individuals, the
value of the residence they occupy is large relative to their total wealth,
home ownership results in poor diversification of their investments rela-
tive to rental. In addition, the market value of an individual's residence
is likely to be positively correlated with important nonfinancial invest-
ments they have made. For example, deterioration in the local job market
may well be reflected in a decrease in housing prices; the individual who
loses his job may therefore find that the value of his house has decreased
at the same time. Or a drop in housing prices may accompany the advent
of other problems in the local environment that the occupant must suffer,
such as an increase in the crime rate or a decline in the quality of the
local schools.
There are, however, contrary cases. In particular, retired persons with
fixed nominal incomes from pensions are exposed to serious risk from
changes in the inflation rate. By purchasing their residence they can
hedge against this risk so far as expenditures on housing are concerned.
3 On the agency costs of debt see, for example, Michael Jensen & William Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
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4. Transaction Costs of Changing Residences
The transaction costs associated with moving from one residence to
another are commonly lower for renters than for owner-occupants. In
particular, the administrative costs of arranging new leases are generally
lower than those associated with a change of title and negotiation of new
debt financing.33 It is presumably for this reason, and perhaps because
the costs of collective governance increase with frequent changes in
membership, that persons with high expected mobility are more likely
than others to choose rental over ownership.
34
5. Incentives Facing the Developer
Finally, when a condominium or cooperative with many units is ini-
tially put on the market-whether it is newly constructed or converted
from rental-there is a common property problem in assessing the quality
of construction. No individual purchaser has an incentive to bear on his
own the full cost of inspecting the common features of the building, such
as structural elements and utilities, adequately to determine their physical
condition. Yet generally the new purchasers have no way to act in concert
to share the costs of such an inspection. Consequently, the developer of
the building has an incentive to provide inefficiently low quality. We
might therefore expect condominiums to exhibit the characteristics of a
"lemons" market,35 and there is some evidence that this has happened.
36
In contrast, a single purchaser who will operate the building on a rental
basis as a landlord, like the purchaser of a single-family house, receives
the full benefit of an inspection and, therefore, has an appropriate incen-
tive to undertake it.
C. The Relative Efficiency of Rental and Ownership
From the preceding survey of the types of costs unique to each form,
it is not obvious a priori whether rental or owner-occupany is most effi-
cient for an apartment building in any particular context. If there were
no other considerations involved, then a simple survivorship test would
33 As discussed in note 94 infra, however, it is not obvious that there need be a large
cost disparity in this regard.
34 See Michael Lea & Michael Wasylenko, Tenure Choice and Condominium Conversion,
14 J. Urb. Econ. 127 (1983).
35 George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970).
36 Consumer distrust of condominium developers was both reflected and fueled by John
D. MacDonald, Condominium (1977), a popular muckraking novel that hangs its entire plot
on the lemons problem in early Florida condominium construction.
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presumably provide the answer: in the long run, market forces would
lead condominiums and cooperatives to displace rental buildings where
and only where the aggregate costs associated with the former are lower.
Moreover, changes over time in the market share of cooperatives and
condominiums would presumably reflect changes in these costs.
But the choice between rental and owner-occupany is also strongly
affected by taxation. Consequently, a survivorship test is misleading
without first taking into account the disparate tax treatment afforded the
two forms of tenancy.
IV. TAX SUBSIDIES
The federal personal income tax, as presently structured, contains large
subsidies for both rental and owner-occupied housing. The relative mag-
nitude of these subsidies determines the net tax subsidy to owner-occu-
pied as opposed to rental housing-that is, the bias in favor of owner-
occupancy that is created by the current tax system, as compared to a
world with no taxes or a world with a tax system that is neutral between
the two forms of ownership. Surprisingly, the existing public finance liter-
ature contains no accurate estimate of this net subsidy. Such an estimate
will consequently be presented here, together with an estimate of the
changes in the magnitude of the net subsidy over the past fifty years.
A. Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupants
1. The Structure of the Subsidy
Although, in the popular mind, the tax subsidy to homeownership vis-
A-vis rental is often associated with the ability to deduct mortgage interest
and property taxes when computing taxable personal income, 7 these de-
ductions are in fact not a source of subsidy. 8 Landlords can also take
these deductions, and in competitive markets-which rental markets pre-
sumably are-the value of the deductions will be passed through to ten-
ants. Rather, as sophisticated analysts have long recognized, the principal
source of the subsidy lies in the failure to include the imputed rental value
31 Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) §§ 163, 164 (1986). These deductions were well estab-
lished by 1936, the earliest year covered by the data below. I.R.C. § 23 (1936).
38 The confusion is widespread. For example, the leading legal treatise on condominiums
states that the deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes is the source of the tax
benefits for condominium housing vis-A-vis rental and is an important reason to choose the
condominium form. Patrick Rohan & Melvin Reskin, Condominium Law and Practice 1
(the introduction) (1988).
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of owner-occupied housing in taxable personal income.39 The value of
this tax subsidy is offset somewhat by the fact that owner-occupants, in
contrast to landlords, are not permitted a deduction for depreciation.4°
The absence of the latter deduction, however, is generally far from suffi-
cient to offset the value of the exclusion of imputed rental income, as the
computations reported below reveal.
In addition, since 1951 owner-occupied housing has benefited from a
special rule that defers taxation of capital gains on sale of a residence so
long as the proceeds of the sale are reinvested in another owner-occupied
" To see clearly the nature of the subsidy, imagine a situation in which two identical
taxpayers occupy identical houses. Then consider two different ways in which these individ-
uals might structure ownership of their houses: in the first, each occupant simply owns his
own house; in the second, each individual owns the house occupied by the other and rents
the house to the other for a fair market rental (which is identical for the two houses). In
the absence of taxes, and setting aside transaction cost and incentive issues of the type
discussed in Section III above, the two different ownership structures are financially equiva-
lent, and the individuals should be indifferent between them. Their invested capital and
annual net income flows are the same in each. Under the tax laws, however, the second
approach is far less attractive since the amount each individual receives as rent on the
house he owns is taxable income, while the (equivalent) amount he pays as rent on
the house he occupies is not deductible. The reason for the distinction is that in general
the tax code only taxes transactions between two distinct persons. When an individual is
his own landlord, there is no such transaction.
There are several ways to eliminate the disparity in the taxation of rented and owner-
occupied housing. One is to tax the imputed rental income of owner-occupants. Another is
to permit tenants a deduction for rental payments. A third is to permit landlords to exclude
from income the rental payments they receive from tenants. If everyone were in the same
marginal tax bracket, and if the expense deductions permitted landlords and owner-occu-
pants were also equalized (for example, by extending depreciation deductions to owner-
occupants as well as landlords), then these three approaches would all be equivalent, except
that the second and third would maintain a subsidy for housing in general (whether rented
or owner-occupied) as opposed to investments in other income-producing assets, while the
first would create a less favorable tax regime for housing than for other consumer durables
such as automobiles and appliances, which are also subject to a tax bias in favor of owner-
ship rather than leasing.
Several European countries either now tax, or have in the recent past taxed, imputed
rental income from housing-including England, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and
Switzerland-though there is reason to doubt the efficacy of these efforts. See Richard
Goode, The Individual Income Tax 121 (1964) (England); and Harvard Internat'l Tax Pro-
gram, World Tax Series: Taxation in France 532-37 (1966), as well as comparable volumes
in this series for the other countries mentioned.
I It is also the case that owner-occupants, in contrast to landlords, are not permitted to
take deductions for current expenses such as maintenance and utilities. Unlike the denial
of depreciation deductions, however, this does not create a bias in favor of rental. The
reason is that an owner is also permitted to exclude from income the imputed amount he
would have to pay himself as landlord to cover these costs, and this exclusion just balances
the absence of the deduction. Or, viewing it the other way, the landlord must include as
income the amounts charged tenants for maintenance and utilities, and then gets a deduction
in equivalent amount for these expenses, thus making the net tax effect zero, just as it is
for an owner.
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residence.4 This rule was supplemented in 1963 by another provision
granting a onetime forgiveness of accumulated capital gains from the sale
of a personal residence when a taxpayer is over 55 years of age.42
2. Application to Cooperatives and Condominiums
Since 1942, tenant-stockholders in housing cooperatives have been per-
mitted to deduct their proportionate share of the mortgage interest and
property taxes paid by the cooperative.43 Prior to that time, no such
deduction was permitted. 44 This does not mean that cooperatives could
not take advantage of the full tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing
prior to 1942; rather, it means that, to get the full subsidy before that
year, the building could not be financed with a mortgage but instead had
to be owned outright by its members 45-which is probably the way that
the luxury buildings that then accounted for most cooperatives were gen-
erally financed.
There is no special provision in the Internal Revenue Code that permits
owner-occupants of condominium units to take deductions for property
taxes and mortgage interest; rather, the deductions are allowed under the
same provisions that apply to homeowners in general. Allowance for
these deductions was first explicitly recognized by the Internal Revenue
Service in 1964.46 It is not clear whether owners of condominium units
prior to that time generally understood that these deductions were avail-
able, although some commentators have argued that the deductions were
always implicit in the general provisions of the code.47
41 I.R.C. § 1034 (1986); I.R.C. § 112(n) (1952).
42 This exclusion has, however, always been subject to a (reasonably generous) ceiling,
which has been increased at intervals through the years; at present the ceiling is $125,000.
I.R.C. § 121 (1986).
41 I.R.C. § 216 (1986), originally enacted as § 128 of the Revenue Act of 1942. A coopera-
tive housing corporation, like a condominium association, is not itself exempt from taxes.
Commissioner v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962). They rarely pay taxes,
however, since they generally assess their members for an amount no greater than their
expenses and thus have no taxable income. See 2 Patrick Rohan & Melvin Reskin, Coopera-
tive Housing: Law and Practice sec. 15.01 (1986).
" See id., sec. 13.01.
45 This is most easily seen by comparing (a) the situation in which a homeowner purchases
a $100,000 home outright, with no mortgage, with (b) that in which the same home is
purchased entirely with borrowed money, while the owner's $100,000 is instead invested
and the returns from that investment used to help pay the interest on the mortgage. If the
homeowner's interest rates for borrowing and lending were the same, then for tax purposes
the two transactions would be identical if mortgage interest were a deductible expense. But
if mortgage interest were not deductible, then only transaction a would have the advantage
of the tax subsidy described in note 39 supra.
4 Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 C.B. 300, 302.
41 See David Clurman & Edna Hebard, Condominiums and Cooperatives 140 (1970).
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TABLE 4
MARGINAL TAX RATES
HOUSEHOLD'S POSITION IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
20% 40% 50% 60% 80% 95% 99% Top
1936 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 79
1946 17 17 19 19 19 27 35 86
1956 20 21 24 24 26 32 43 91
1966 18 20 22 22 27 36 46 70
1976 19 25 27 28 36 45 58 70
1985 17 24 28 32 42 45 48 50
1988 15 15 15 28 28 28 28 28
SouRcES.-Computed by applying tax tables for respective years to income figures in Table 5. Figures
for 1988 were computed by applying 1988 tax rates to 1985 income figures.
3. Interaction with Tax Brackets
The value of these subsidies is roughly proportional to the owner's
marginal tax rate (or, more precisely, the average tax rate that would be
applicable to the owner's imputed rental income if it were taxed). An
individual in a high tax bracket receives a substantial subsidy, while an
individual who pays no taxes receives no subsidy at all.
Because tax rates have changed over time, the value of the tax subsidy
to owner-occupancy has changed, too. In general, average tax rates have
increased through the years and jumped especially sharply at the time of
the Second World War. To provide some sense of this, Table 4 gives an
estimate, for a series of years between 1936 and 1988, of the marginal tax
bracket facing persons at different points in the income distribution. The
first column, for example, gives the marginal tax bracket of a person
whose income falls at the twentieth percentile (from the bottom) of the
income distribution, while the seventh column gives the marginal tax
bracket confronting a person in the ninety-ninth percentile (that is, the
top 1 percent of the income distribution).48 The eighth column gives the
highest marginal rate applied to anyone in the year in question. The latter
rate, it should be noted, applies to very few individuals for the years
1936-56. In 1936, for example, the top rate applied to incomes in excess
of $5 million, while median household income in that year was only
$1,069, and an income of $9,258 put a household in the top 1 percent of
the distribution (see Table 5).
0 In fact, Table 4 almost surely gives an overestimate of effective marginal tax rates
because it uses rates applicable to the household income figures from Table 5, and the latter
figures are probably higher in general than the adjusted gross income figures to which the
marginal tax rates actually apply.
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TABLE 5
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN CURRENT DOLLARS
HOUSEHOLD'S POSITION IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
20% 40% 50% 60% 80% 95% 99%
1936 551 890 1,069 1,272 1,922 3,453 9,258
1946 1,024 1,988 2,417 2,867 4,105 7,721 10,791
1956 1,648 3,451 4,226 4,984 6,952 11,633 18,871
1966 2,556 5,263 6,465 7,691 11,000 19,355 28,869
1976 5,462 10,197 12,686 15,399 22,142 35,174 56,649
1985 9,999 18,945 23,618 29,529 45,158 67,018 105,466
SouRcEs.-Computed by interpolation (or, in the case of the ninety-ninth percentile, extrapolation)
from U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Consumer Income
Ser. P-60, no. I Rev., at 17, table 3; no. 27, at 23, table 5; no. 53, at 23, table 1; U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1938, at 304, table 346.
Table 4 shows that the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing was
nonexistent for everyone except those in roughly the top 1 percent of the
income distribution in 1936, and, even for many households in the top 1
percent, the tax rate was so low as to make the subsidy quite modest.
After the war, however, tax rates became large enough to make the sub-
sidy significant for the great majority of households, and increasingly so
through the middle 1970s.
We cannot, however, conclude from Table 4 alone that the tax code
in recent decades has provided a substantial incentive for owner-occu-
pancy as opposed to rental since the tax code also subsidizes rental
housing.
B. Tax Subsidies to Landlords
The federal tax code provides a subsidy to rental properties vis-A-vis
other investments to the extent that it permits the owner of a rental
building to take depreciation deductions that exceed the real rate of eco-
nomic depreciation. In particular, between 1954 and 1986 the tax code
made depreciation deductions extremely generous by permitting them to
be computed according to the double declining balance method.4 9 More-
over, landlords were allowed to finance rental buildings through limited
partnerships that permitted outside investors (serving as the limited part-
ners) to shelter income they received from other sources by offsetting
against it the large tax losses that the depreciation rules generated in
49 I.R.C. § 167 (1986). For the years before and after this, straight-line depreciation was
the method generally called for. I.R.C. § 23(1) (1936), (1946); I.R.C. § 167 (1988). An
appendix with details of computation is available from me on request.
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the early years of the real estate investment. The result was that the
depreciation deductions could effectively be sold to taxpayers in high tax
brackets, thus permitting landlords to extract maximum value from the
deductions.
The value of the excess depreciation deductions has, however, been
limited in some years by two devices. The first is a "recapture" rule
under which, at the time a building is sold, taxes must be paid at ordinary
income rates on some or all of that portion of the capital gain accounted
for by accelerated depreciation deductions.5" The recapture rules first
came into effect in 1963 and were subsequently stiffened in 1970 and
1976.51
The second device is a "minimum" tax rate applied to certain tax
preference items if they exceed a given total. Accelerated depreciation
and capital gains are among the tax preference items affected. The mini-
mum tax first took effect in 1970, with a rate of 10 percent. In 1976 the
rate was increased to 15 percent, and the tax was otherwise tightened
then as well. Since 1983 the rate for the minimum tax has been 20 percent.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 severely diminished the tax subsidy to
rental housing. Depreciation deductions were substantially reduced and
in many cases limited to the straight-line method. The minimum "useful
life" over which a building could be depreciated was increased to 27.5
years. (It had been as low as 15 years from 1981 to 1984.) The capital
gains exclusion was eliminated, leaving capital gains from the sale of a
building to be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. The maximum
marginal tax rate was reduced from 50 percent to 33 percent, and to 28
percent for the wealthiest taxpayers, thus reducing the value of deprecia-
tion deductions. Taxpayers were prohibited from offsetting ordinary
earned income with "passive" losses from investments in real estate.
52
And, finally, an "at-risk rule" was adopted to prevent investors from
using nonrecourse debt as leverage to increase the value of depreciation
deductions per dollar invested. 53 The effect was essentially to eliminate
the familiar real estate tax shelter. Although the minimum tax was re-
tained, the changes just described render it largely irrelevant so far as
ownership of rental property is concerned.
I That is, on the amount by which the accumulated depreciation deductions taken exceed
those that could have been taken under a straight-line depreciation method. Details of
computation are in my appendix.
5' For a more detailed account in the context of computations similar to those undertaken
here, see Patric Hendershott & James Shilling, The Economics of Tenure Choice, 1955-79,
in Research in Real Estate 105, 114-15 (C. F. Sirmans ed. 1982).
52 1.R.C. § 469-
" I.R.C. § 465.
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C. The Value of the Net Subsidy to Owner-Occupancy
The value of the net tax subsidy to owner-occupied as opposed to rental
housing is the difference in value between the respective tax subsidies to
owner-occupied and rental properties just described. The magnitude of
these two sets of subsidies, and thus of their difference, depends on a
variety of factors that vary over time and across individuals. These fac-
tors include the respective tax brackets of the occupants and owners of
buildings, prevailing interest and inflation rates, and the specific tax rules
in effect.
Several recent studies have undertaken computations of the differential
tax subsidy to owner-occupied versus rental housing for various spans of
time and have sought to determine the influence of this net subsidy on
tenure choice (that is, on the choice between owner-occupancy and
rental).54 These studies are not directly suited to the purpose at hand
here, however, for several reasons. First, they all conflate the tenure
choice issue with the choice of type of housing. That is, they assume
explicity or implicitly that the choice involved is between renting a unit
in an apartment building or purchasing a single-family home, rather than
simply between occupying a given unit in an apartment building either as
a renter or as an owner. Thus, in these studies, tax considerations are
inextricably intertwined with other factors that make the own/rent tenure
choice different for these two different types of housing. Second, the
preceding problem is compounded in most of these studies by the fact that
the figure they use for the after-tax cost of rental is simply an empirically
observed market rental rate that reflects a variety of nontax considera-
tions. Third, none of these studies extend back in time to the period
before the Second World War, and thus they do not permit a comparison
of recent years with the markedly different tax regime that prevailed then.
Only one sophisticated study, by Patric Hendershott and James Shil-
ling,55 avoids the second of the preceding problems by computing the
cost of both renting and owning as the present value of the expected
stream of after-tax cash flows that an individual would expect to face
under the type of tenure in question. Using this method, Hendershott
and Shilling derive an estimate of the relative costs of owning and renting
54 Hendershott & Shilling, supra note 51; Harvey Rosen, Housing Decisions and the U.S.
Income Tax: An Econometric Analysis, I I J. Pub. Econ. 1 (1979); Harvey Rosen & Kenneth
Rosen, Federal Taxes and Homeownership: Evidence from Time Series, 88 J. Pol. Econ.
59 (1980). An earlier and less sophisticated effort appears in John Shelton, The Cost of
Renting versus Owning a Home, 44 Land Econ. 59 (1968). See also Harvey Rosen, Housing
Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and Equity, in I Handbook of Public
Economics 375 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin S. Feldstein eds. 1985).
55 Hendershott & Shilling, supra note 51.
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for each quarter between 1955 and 1979. Unfortunately, even these re-
sults cannot be used directly to compare the relative advantage of orga-
nizing a given building as a rental building versus a cooperative or condo-
minium. The most important reason for this is that Hendershott and
Shilling's computations are infected with the first problem described
above: they impute some costs to the rental form that they do not to
owner-occupancy, and vice versa, on the assumption that different types
of structures are involved. In addition, their results are influenced, in
some cases strongly, by particular assumptions about which reasonable
analysts might differ-for example, concerning expected inflation in
housing prices.56
Consequently, new calculations have been undertaken here to develop
a more accurate measure of the net tax subsidy to cooperatives and con-
dominiums as opposed to rental housing. The method used is similar to
that employed by Hendershott and Shilling. The cost of housing for own-
er-occupants in a given year was computed as the present value of the
future after-tax cash flows that an individual would reasonably have ex-
pected if he were to buy his living unit in that year. These costs were
computed over the period of years that an average individual would be
likely to own a home. (Because of the nature of the tax rules applicable
to owner-occupied housing, the calculation is in most cases invariant to
the number of years assumed.)
Similarly, the cost to a landlord of renting out a unit in a given year
was computed as the present value of the future after-tax cash expenses
that the landlord would reasonably have expected if she purchased a
building in that year, computed over the number of years that she would
reasonably plan to own the building if she were to seek to minimize her
after-tax costs. This becomes the cost for renters if the landlord charges
a rental just equal to the landlord's full cost (which here includes a market
rate of return on capital and services); the conditions under which this
will occur are discussed below.
In effect, these calculations give the annual cost of owner-occupancy
and of rental, respectively, per dollar spent on the initial purchase price
of the building. In the long run, the purchase price of a building should
be determined by the cost of construction and should, therefore, be the
same whether the purchaser is a landlord or a condominium association.
Consequently, by comparing the figures yielded by these calculations we
obtain a measure of the difference in cost that results, by virtue of the
5 An appendix (available from me on request) shows the sensitivity of the computations
to differing assumptions concerning the most important variables.
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TABLE 6
AFTER-TAX COST OF HOUSING AS A % OF BUILDING VALUE
LANDLORD/OWNER-OCCUPANT'S POSITION IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
20% 40% 50% 60% 80% 95% 99% Top




























5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.03 6.70
5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08 4.77 1.63
4.21 4.21 4.13 4.13 4.13 3.78 3.35 7.45
3.73 3.73 3.61 3.61 3.61 3.12 2.64 -. 11
7.13 7.09 6.99 6.99 6.91 6.67 6.10 -3.92
6.16 6.08 5.85 5.85 5.70 5.23 4.39 1.43
6.76 6.68 6.60 6.60 6.38 5.92 5.50 3.85
5.89 5.73 5.57 5.57 5.17 4.44 3.78 2.32
3.22 2.69 2.50 2.41 2.02 1.45 .18 -1.95
2.51 1.86 1.65 1.54 .98 .34 -. 58 -1.43
8.08 7.62 7.44 7.23 6.61 6.38 6.12 5.93
7.12 6.19 5.65 5.12 3.79 3.43 3.16 2.97
8.88 8.88 8.88 8.83 8.83 8.83 8.83 8.83
7.39 7.39 7.39 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65
3.87 3.41 3.25 3.17 2.87 2.44 1.48
8.74 8.34 8.20 8.05 7.56 7.38 7.18
tax code alone, from operating the same building on a rental basis on the
one hand or as a cooperative or condominium on the other.
These computations were undertaken for the years 1936, 1946, 1956,
1966, 1976, and 1985. In addition, figures were projected for 1988 by
recomputing the results for 1985 using the tax rules in effect in 1988. The
results are given in Tables 6 and 7.57
Table 6 gives the annual cost of housing for both rental and owner-
occupancy for each of the years in question, stated as a percentage of
the market value of the building. Or, more precisely, the figures in Table
" The equations and data used for these computations are described in detail in my
appendix.
TABLE 7
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RENTAL COST AND OWNER-OCCUPANCY COST AS A % OF BUILDING VALUE
OWNER'S POSITION IN
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
















































MARGINAL LANDLORD'S POSITION IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
20% 40% 50% 60% 80% 95% 99% Top
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 - .05 1.62
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 - .05 1.62
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 -. 05 1.62
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 - .05 1.62
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 -. 05 1.62
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 - .05 1.62
.31 .31 .31 .31 .31 .31 .26 1.93
3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.40 5.07
.48 .48 .40 .40 .40 .05 -. 38 -11.18
.48 .48 .40 .40 .40 .05 -. 38 -11.18
.60 .60 .52 .52 .52 .17 -. 26 -11.06
.60 .60 .52 .52 .52 .17 -. 26 -11.06
.60 .60 .52 .52 .52 .17 -. 26 -11.06
1.09 1.09 1.01 1.01 1.01 .66 .23 -10.57
1.57 1.57 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.14 .71 -10.09
4.32 4.32 4.24 4.24 4.24 3.89 3.46 -7.34
.97 .93 .83 .83 .75 .51 -.06 - 10.08
1.05 1.01 .91 .91 .83 .59 .02 -10.00
1.28 1.24 1.14 1.14 1.06 .82 .25 -9.77
1.28 1.24 1.14 1.14 1.06 .82 .25 -9.77
1.43 1.39 1.29 1.29 1.21 .97 .40 -9.62
1.90 1.86 1.76 1.76 1.68 1.44 .87 -9.15
2.74 2.70 2.60 2.60 2.52 2.28 1.71 -8.31
5.70 5.66 5.56 5.56 5.48 5.24 4.67 -5.35
.87 .79 .71 .71 .49 .03 - .39 -2.04
1.03 .95 .87 .87 .65 .19 -. 23 -1.88
1.19 1.11 1.03 1.03 .81 .35 -. 07 -1.72
1.19 1.11 1.03 1.03 .81 .35 -. 07 -1.72
1.59 1.51 1.43 1.43 1.21 .75 .33 -1.32
2.32 2.24 2.16 2.16 1.94 1.48 1.06 -. 59
2.98 2.90 2.82 2.82 2.60 2.14 1.72 .07
4.44 4.36 4.28 4.28 4.06 3.60 3.18 1.53
.71 .18 -. 01 -. 10 -. 49 -1.06 -2.33 -4.46
1.36 .83 .64 .55 .16 - .41 -1.68 -3.81
1.57 1.04 .85 .76 .37 -. 20 -1.47 -3.60
1.68 1.15 .96 .87 .48 -. 09 -1.36 -3.49
2.24 1.71 1.52 1.43 1.04 .47 -. 80 -2.93
2.88 2.35 2.16 2.07 1.68 1.11 -. 16 -2.29
3.80 3.27 3.08 2.99 2.60 2.03 .76 -1.37
4.65 4.12 3.93 3.84 3.45 2.88 1.61 -. 52
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
MARGINAL LANDLORD'S POSITION IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
OWNER'S POSITION IN








































.96 .50 .32 .11 -. 51
1.89 1.43 1.25 1.04 .42
2.43 1.97 1.79 1.58 .96
2.96 2.50 2.32 2.11 1.49
4.29 3.83 3.65 3.44 2.82
4.65 4.19 4.01 3.80 3.18
4.92 4.46 4.28 4.07 3.45
5.11 4.65 4.47 4.26 3.64
1.49 1.49 1.49 1.44 1.44
1.49 1.49 1.49 1.44 1.44
1.49 1.49 1.49 1.44 1.44
3.23 3.23 3.23 3.18 3.18
3.23 3.23 3.23 3.18 3.18
3.23 3.23 3.23 3.18 3.18
3.23 3.23 3.23 3.18 3.18
3.23 3.23 3.23 3.18 3.18
1.36 .90 .74 .66 .36
2.01 1.55 1.39 1.31 1.01
2.22 1.76 1.60 1.52 1.22
2.33 1.87 1.71 1.63 1.33
2.89 2.43 2.27 2.19 1.89
3.53 3.07 2.91 2.83 2.53
4.45 3.99 3.83 3.75 3.45
5.30 4.84 4.68 4.60 4.30
1.62 1.22 1.08 .93 .44
2.55 2.15 2.01 1.86 1.37
3.09 2.69 2.55 2.40 1.91
3.62 3.22 3.08 2.93 2.44
4.95 4.55 4.41 4.26 3.77
5.31 4.91 4.77 4.62 4.13
5.58 5.18 5.04 4.89 4.40
5.77 5.37 5.23 5.08 4.59
6 give the capital costs associated with the two forms of tenure-that is,
the cost of the invested and borrowed capital and the cost of depreciation,
plus net taxes. Other costs of housing-such as maintenance of the build-
ing, utilities, and other services-are not included here since their after-
tax cost should be the same whether an individual owns or rents. More-
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surveyed in Section II, which, as we have seen, may be affected by
tenure choice.
Because the cost of housing for an owner-occupant depends on the
owner's tax bracket, and the cost of rental housing similarly depends on
the landlord's tax bracket, the different columns in Table 6 give a series
of eight different cost figures for both ownership and rental for each year
to reflect different tax brackets. The tax brackets chosen for each year
were those given in Table 4, corresponding to different points in the
income distribution. The columns of Table 6 correspond to the columns
in Table 4. For example, the first column gives figures for individuals
who are in the tax bracket corresponding to a household income repre-
senting the twentieth percentile of the income distribution, while the last
column gives figures for individuals who are in the top marginal tax
bracket.
The figures in part A of Table 6 are computed on the assumption that
the minimum tax is not binding on the landlord during the years in which
that tax was in effect (1976 and 1985). Part B of Table 6 gives alternative
figures for the latter years, computed with the assumption that the mini-
mum tax was binding on the landlord. As part B shows, the minimum
tax raises the landlord's cost substantially.
To find an individual's cost of ownership for a given year from Table
6, one simply looks at the column corresponding to the individual's posi-
tion in the income distribution. On the other hand, while the rows labeled
"rent" in Table 6 similarly give the landlord's cost as a function of her
tax bracket, this does not necessarily become the tenants' cost. If, as
seems plausible, the market for rental apartments is reasonably competi-
tive, then market forces will drive rents to equal the cost (as given in
Table 6) for the marginal landlord-that is, the landlord with the highest
cost among those who remain in the market when supply equals demand.
And the landlord with the highest cost is the one in the lowest tax
bracket.5 8 Consequently, the cost of rental to the renter for a given year
is given by the figure in Table 6 for that tax bracket that is the tax bracket
of the marginal landlord. Landlords in higher tax brackets will be earning
pure profits, while those in lower brackets will be driven from the market.
Unfortunately, we have no reliable empirical data on the tax bracket
of marginal landlords. Because of the ease of syndicating investments in
real estate through limited partnerships, however, it is reasonable to as-
sume that, at least for large or luxury apartment buildings prior to the
8 The term "landlord" is used here to refer collectively to the owners of a building,
which will often include a number of investors acting as limited partners. The relevant tax
bracket is the tax bracket of the investors.
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Tax Reform Act of 1986,"9 this bracket was relatively high.' In any event,
the columns of Table 6 permit one to see the effect on market rents of
different assumptions about the tax bracket of marginal landlords.
Examination of Table 6 shows that the after-tax cost of housing has
changed considerably over the years for both rental and owner-occu-
pancy, in large part as a result of changes in the tax regime. For example,
we can see that the substantial tax subsidies built into the personal in-
come tax have generally made housing substantially less expensive, for
both renters and owners, in the postwar years than it was in the 1930s.
Also, comparison of the figures for 1985 and 1988 shows that the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 should in most cases have significantly increased the
cost of housing for both renters and owners. Such changes in themselves,
however, are not our primary concern here. Rather, we are concerned
with the difference between the cost of renting and the cost of owning
and with the changes in that difference over time.
The figures in Table 6 permit us to observe that difference-that is, to
compare the after-tax cost to an individual of occupying the same apart-
ment when it is (a) in a building organized on a rental basis and (b) in a
building organized as a condominium or cooperative. To make the com-
parison for a given year, one simply compares (a) the figure in the "rent"
row in the column corresponding to the marginal landlord's position in the
income distribution with (b) the figure in the "own" row corresponding to
the individual's position in the income distribution.
Table 7 gives these differences for the years and the tax brackets re-
flected in Table 6. To take an example, consider the figures in Table 7,
part A, for 1976; they show that an individual who is in the eightieth
percentile of the income distribution would face an annual cost of housing
that is lower by .47 percent of the market value of the living unit if he
were to own the unit rather than rent it and if the tax bracket of marginal
landlords were that of persons in the ninety-fifth percentile of the income
distribution. Since, from Table 6, part A, the annual cost of renting from
such a landlord would be 1.45 percent of the market value of the unit,
this represents a saving of 32 percent over the cost of rental. (Again, we
19 It is possible that, at least for buildings below a certain scale, landlords are often of a
socioeconomic status not far removed from that of their tenants. This is likely to be the
case, for example, where there are substantial economies from having the owner reside in
or near the building. As a result, the marginal tax bracket for landlords of such buildings
might be lower than that for landlords of large or luxury buildings.
I The marginal bracket for landlords may, however, nevertheless be lower than the top
bracket or even that of the ninety-ninth percentile of the household income distribution.
For example, the tax rate at which the after-tax interest on municipal bonds equals that on
comparable taxable bonds has generally been well below the maximum bracket, indicating
that the marginal investor in such bonds is not in the top bracket.
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TABLE 8
SAVINGS FROM OWNER-OCCUPANCY WHEN MARGINAL LANDLORD AND OWNER-OCCUPANT ARE
BOTH IN NINETY-FIFTH PERCENTILE
WITHOUT MINIMUM TAX WITH MINIMUM TAX
Savings Rent Savings Rent
from from Savings from from Savings
Table 7, Table 6, as % Table 7, Table 6, as %
Part A Part A of Rent Part B Part B of Rent
1936 .00 5.08 0 ...... ...
1946 .66 3.78 17 ...... ...
1956 1.44 6.67 22 ...... ...
1966 1.48 5.92 25 ... .
1976 1.11 1.45 77 2.10 2.44 86
1985 2.95 6.38 46 3.95 7.38 54
1988 3.18 8.83 36 ... ... ...
are speaking here of capital costs; the savings as a percentage of the total
market rental cost would be smaller.) Or, put in dollar terms, the annual
savings on an apartment with a market value of $100,000 would be $470.61
A clear measure of the pure tax subsidy to owner-occupancy is offered
by the figures on the diagonals in Table 7, giving the cost difference when
the occupant and the marginal landlord are in the same tax bracket. The
first column in Table 8 restates these figures for the tax bracket corres-
ponding to the ninety-fifth percentile of the income distribution. The third
column in Table 8 gives the cost savings from owner-occupancy as a
percentage of the capital cost of renting (col. 2). The fourth through sixth
columns give the corresponding figures under the assumption that the
minimum tax applies. From the figures in the third column, we see that
the percentage savings goes from zero in the 1930s, to a peak of over 77
percent in 1976, and then falls off somewhat after that. The absolute
dollar savings from owner-occupancy, on the other hand, reaches its peak
in 1988, when (as shown by the first column) it amounts to an annual
saving equal to 3.18 percent of the value of the housing unit (or $3,180
on a unit costing $100,000).62 If the minimum tax is binding on marginal
61 The calculations of tax savings from owner-occupancy presented here are reasonably
robust. Computations of the sensitivity of the results to differing assumptions concerning
a variety of variables, including interest rates and expected inflation, show that the net tax
savings from owner-occupancy in any given year is not much affected by these assumptions,
with the exception of expectations concerning housing price increases, which are discussed
in the following note.
I The computation of tax savings offered here, it should be noted, is probably conserva-
tive for recent years. In particular, the calculations have been made on the assumption that
potential purchasers of housing foresaw none of the unusually rapid increase in housing
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landlords, then the savings are even more dramatic in 1976 and 1985, as
the last three columns show.
Although the percentage savings reported in the third and sixth col-
umns of Table 8 are impressive-amounting to between 77 percent and
86 percent of the capital cost of housing in 1976-the absolute dollar
savings from owner-occupany (as reflected, for example, in the first and
fourth columns of Table 8) is probably more important for the purpose
at hand. The question here is whether the tax subsidy to owner-occu-
pancy as opposed to rental is large enough to dominate, for a significant
share of housing market participants, any other costs (of the type dis-
cussed in Section II above) that would otherwise lead to the choice of
rental rather than ownership. Those other costs are likely to be only
partially proportional to the capital cost of housing.
To judge more clearly the magnitude of this tax subsidy for coopera-
tives and condominiums, imagine that a new apartment building was con-
structed in 1985 with 100 units, at a cost of $150,000 per unit (or $15
million in total). Using the figures from Table 8, aggregate tax savings of
$442,500 per year ($592,500 if the minimum tax were applicable) would
have been expected for the building as a whole if the developer sold off
the apartments as condominium units rather than retaining title to the
building and renting out the apartments.
D. Implications for the Spread of Cooperatives and Condominiums
Over the fifty-year period covered by Table 7 there has been a clear
progression toward stronger tax subsidies for owner-occupied as opposed
to rental housing. In 1936, there was a net tax subsidy in favor of owner-
ship only for housing occupants in the top 1 percent of the income distri-
bution, regardless of the landlord's tax bracket, and that subsidy was
substantial only for the small number of individuals in the very highest
marginal brackets.6 3 By 1956, there was a net subsidy in favor of owner-
prices that occurred in the 1970s but, rather, assumed that housing prices would just keep
pace with the overall inflation rate. Hendershott & Shilling, supra note 51, based their
calculations on the alternative assumption that consumers expected housing prices to con-
tinue to follow the trend of the recent past. This is one important reason why they show a
larger savings from owner-occupancy than is reflected in the figures presented here. The
expected savings from owner-occupancy shown here would be considerably larger for the
1970s if consumers were assumed to have correctly anticipated that housing prices would
increase substantially in the future.
63 Table 7 shows a net subsidy to ownership over rental for occupants in all income
classes when the landlord is in the top tax bracket. But this is a consequence of the higher
taxes paid by a landlord in that bracket rather than a subsidy to ownership; consequently,
there would be no incentive for individuals in the top tax bracket to serve as landlords, and
the right-hand column in Table 7 can be ignored for 1936.
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TABLE 9
NET TAX SUBSIDY AND CONSTRUCTION DATA FOR 1970-86 (with Minimum Tax)
Ratio of Condo
Difference and Co-op Units
Year Rent Own (Rent - Own) to Total Units
1970 4.27 2.95 1.32 N.A.
1971 3.85 2.74 1.11 N.A.
1972 4.87 3.51 1.36 N.A.
1973 5.57 4.07 1.50 .19
1974 3.67 2.55 1.12 .29
1975 1.89 .90 .99 .17
1976 2.44 .98 1.46 .17
1977 2.01 .98 1.03 .14
1978 2.34 .95 1.39 .19
1979 .43 .13 .30 .28
1980 -. 20 -. 48 .28 .34
1981 .90 .80 .10 .38
1982 4.46 3.09 1.37 .32
1983 6.16 4.39 1.77 .31
1984 7.67 5.79 3.88 .29
1985 7.38 4.67 2.71 .19
1986 6.31 4.09 2.22 .21
NOTE.-N.A. = not available.
ship in nearly all cases except when the landlord was in the top tax
bracket. By 1966 and 1976 (using part B of Table 7), this net subsidy had
broadened further to include all cases in which the potential landlord and
occupant were in the same tax bracket. Finally, by 1988 there was a
substantial net tax subsidy in favor of ownership in all cases. This pattern
of development corresponds, in general terms, with the evolution of con-
dominium and cooperative housing. In the 1930s, such housing was
largely confined to the luxury market. The market share of cooperatives
then grew, though at a modest pace, through the 1950s and was supple-
mented by the condominium form in the 1960s. Thereafter, the two forms
together spread with increasing rapidity.
On the other hand, for some shorter intervals within this broad fifty-
year period, the correlation between the net subsidy to ownership and
the rate of formation of cooperatives and condominiums is poor. In par-
ticular, although the major increase in the rate of formation of coopera-
tives and condominiums occurred in the middle 1970s, the net tax subsidy
was not generally stronger then than it was in 1966 and, except for land-
lords in the very top tax bracket, was not markedly stronger than it was
even in 1956. Moreover, if we look at annual data for more recent years,
the correlation is even worse. Table 9 gives, for 1970-86, annual figures
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FIGUlRE I.-Net tax subsidy and new construction, 1973-86
for the net tax subsidy to ownership as well as the percentage of new
construction of multiunit housing represented by cooperatives and condo-
miniums; the data are graphed in Figure 1. As the latter figure shows,
for this period the rate of formation of cooperatives and condominiums
correlates negatively, if at all, with the net subsidy to ownership. This is
confirmed by statistical analysis, which shows a negative coefficient when
the rate of formation of cooperatives and condominiums is regressed
against either current or lagged figures for the net tax subsidy.'
Consequently, if tax subsidies have been an important inducement to
the development of condominium and cooperative housing, the effect
must have been long-term and slow acting. Before we can draw further
6 When the figures in the last column of Table 9 (ratio of condominium and cooperative
units constructed during the year to total multiunit housing units constructed) are regressed
against the figures in the second to last column ("Difference" -that is, the difference
between the rent and own cost, or the net tax subsidy to ownership) plus a constant, the
coefficient is negative whether the difference figure chosen is that for the current year or
is lagged one or two years-though it is (just barely) significant at the 5 percent level only
when the Difference variable is lagged two years. (The rent cost figures in Table 9 assume
that the minimum tax applies to the landlord. If, alternatively, the minimum tax is omitted
in computing the rental cost, then the regression coefficient for Difference is significant at
the 5 percent level when the Difference variable is lagged either one or two years, though
the magnitude of the coefficient remains roughly the same.)
(Coop + Condo) / Total
-- ------- Rent - On
00v
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conclusions concerning the effects of tax subsidies, however, we must
examine other developments that may have affected supply and demand
for owner-occupied apartments, including changes in some of the costs
surveyed in Section III.
V. OTHER FINANCIAL INFLUENCES
A. Rent Control
Rent control creates a strong incentive for adopting the cooperative
and condominium forms as means of securing a higher rate of return on
apartment buildings. However, rent control can quickly be dismissed as
a direct cause of the recent spread of cooperatives and condominiums
in general. Only a small minority of those American cities that have
experienced a recent surge in cooperatives and condominiums have rent
control.65 Indeed, at least so far as conversions from rental to ownership
are concerned (as opposed to new construction), jurisdictions with rent
control seem to experience less activity than noncontrolled jurisdictions.'
On the other hand, it is possible that the fear of rent control has pro-
vided at least some of the incentive for the recent surge in condominiums.
In the past twenty years, rent control has begun to spread at a rapidly
accelerating pace through American jurisdictions.67 This development,
together with the adoption of rent control throughout much of Western
Europe in this century, may serve to discourage many potential land-
lords.
B. Increasing Liquidity
The increase in popularity of apartment ownership in recent years
might be thought attributable, in part at least, to an increase in liquidity
among apartment dwellers that permitted a greater proportion to invest
the equity necessary for ownership.
For the population at large, however, a direct correlation between
65 HUD, supra note 7, at ii.
6 For example, Chicago, which does not have rent control, had a far higher rate of
conversion over the period 1970-79 (5.44 percent of the rental housing stock) than did New
York City (.58 percent), which does. The reason for this pattern may be that jurisdictions
with rent control have sought to protect those controls by adopting stricter regulation of
conversions than have jurisidictions without rent control. Id. at app. 1, 10-11.
67 Although in 1970 New York City was evidently the only American city with rent
control, by 1979 rent control had been adopted in at least 250 local jurisdictions. Major
cities with some form of rent control today include Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston,
and Washington, D.C. Charles Baird, Rent Control: The Perennial Folly (1980); National
Multi Unit Housing Council, The Spread of Rent Control (1982).
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FIGURE 2.-Median income of two-person and four-person families in constant (1987)
dollars, 1955-87.
household income and changes in the market share of owner-occupied
apartments is lacking. As Figure 2 shows, in the middle and late 1970s,
when apartment ownership first began to spread rapidly, there was virtu-
ally no overall growth in real family income, in sharp contrast to the
preceding two decades.' Moreover, housing prices increased in the 1970s
more rapidly than inflation in general, in contrast to the experience of the
two preceding decades, thus increasing the price of housing relative to
household income.69 At best it can be argued that the spread of apartment
ownership in the 1970s was a delayed response to the increased liquidity
resulting from growth in household income in earlier decades-the delay
perhaps being caused by the need to develop and become familiar with
the condominium form.
70
Alternatively, special factors could have led to increased liquidity
among apartment occupants as opposed to the general population. For
example, it seems likely that in the late 1960s and 1970s there was a
substantial increase in the general liquidity of the elderly owing to the
68 For the period 1970-86, median household income, measured in constant 1986 dollars,
reached its highest value ($25,936) in 1973 and declined to its lowest value ($22,913) in 1982;
in 1979 it was $24,866. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1988, table 691 (1987).
69 See Hendershott & Shilling, supra note 51.
70 See Sec. VI infra.
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combined accumulated influence of pension funds and social security,
and this may have led to an increase in the demand for condominiums
among that subset of the population.7 It is also sometimes said that the
1970s saw the advent of a large new class of highly liquid apartment
dwellers consisting of the relatively affluent childless young households
resulting from the increasing tendencies for marriage and childbearing to
be postponed and for women to enter the work force. It is difficult to
locate sufficient demographic data on occupants of apartments to assess
this latter argument, although it is questionable that any such demo-
graphic shift could have been so pronounced as to correlate well with the
rapid expansion of cooperative and condominium housing in the 1970s.
Moreover, there is another consideration that argues in general against
increasing liquidity as an important cause of the growing market share
of cooperatives and condominiums. This market share increased rapidly
during the late 1970s, just as inflation rates were becoming exceptionally
high. Yet a high rate of inflation seriously aggravates liquidity problems
for many prospective homeowners because it increases substantially the
nominal interest payments on mortgages, effectively making the borrower
repay the principal much faster than otherwise and requiring a large an-
nual outflow of cash.72
In addition, throughout this century there have been substantial num-
bers of apartment dwellers who were quite prosperous and yet, until the
recent past, rented; for these individuals, at least, liquidity must not have
been constraining.
C. Mortgage Insurance
Another factor affecting the liquidity of occupants of apartment build-
ings has been the advent of federal mortgage insurance. Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance, which was first made avail-
able for single-family dwellings in the 1930s, was extended to the con-
struction and purchase of cooperative apartments in 195013 and to condo-
miniums in 1961. 7"
This program has not directly affected the incentives for lending to
71 On the other hand, the adoption in 1963 of the onetime forgiveness of accumulated
capital gains from. the sale of a personal residence for taxpayers over 55 years of age
presumably made it easier for many elderly persons to sell the large houses in which they
had raised children and rent an apartment unit rather than remain owners.
2 It would be otherwise if repayments of principal on home mortgages were indexed for
inflation, but this has generally not been the practice.
73 National Housing Act of 1950, § 213.
7" Housing Act of 1961, § 104, 75 stat. 160 (adding § 234 to the National Housing Act).
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cooperatives and condominiums in any significant degree. To begin with,
FHA mortgate insurance has been sold at a rate that is remunerative for
the government and thus has not provided a subsidy for owner-occupancy
as opposed to rental.75 Moreover, the numbers of units insured have been
only a small fraction of the total constructed or converted.
76
The advent of FHA mortgage insurance may, however, have had an
indirect effect in easing credit for purchase of apartments. After the De-
pression of the 1930s, when many cooperatives failed, cooperatives were
widely thought to be unusually risky borrowers because of the common-
property feature of the mortgage. 77 Condominium developments, in turn,
were novel when first introduced, and lenders might well have been wary
of them. The availability of FHA mortgage insurance presumably helped
allay such fears by essentially eliminating the risk of default in return for
a modest premium. But the effect of the insurance may well have been felt
too by projects that were not federally insured. The FHA's willingness to
insure such projects may have generated confidence in the forms by itself.
Moreover, the low default rates on insured projects presumably helped
demonstrate to lenders that owner-occupied apartment units were not
unusually risky and, thus, were worth lending to even in the absence of
federal insurance (which, with its flat fee structure, is relatively costly in
cases in which the borrower can provide reasonable security). Federal
mortgage insurance had a strong demonstration effect of this sort for
single-family houses in the 1930s when the advent of such insurance,
even though unsubsidized, led to a substantial easing in the terms of
residential mortgages in general, including significantly longer repayment
periods and lower down payments. 71 Yet federal mortgage insurance be-
came available for cooperatives and condominiums long before the
marked expansion in the market share of those forms. Consequently, any
such demonstration effect was evidently modest.7 9
" See Henry Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies 77-79, 176-99 (1972); see also Donald Cun-
ningham & Patric Hendershott, Pricing FHA Mortgage Default Insurance, 3 Housing Fin.
Rev. 373 (1984).
76 From 1961-86, the FHA insured a total of 60,296 mortgages for the purchase of condo-
minium units by individuals and insured as well mortages for the purchase or construction
of buildings for development as condominiums containing a total of 27,452 units. Telephone
interview with Robert Sacrey, chief management information specialist for Single Family
Insured Activity, Federal Housing Administration (November 1986). This compares with a
total stock of 1,389,000 condominium units in 1983. See Table I supra.
7 See Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 3, at 234.
78 Aaron, supra note 75, at 74-90.
79 The federal government has also facilitated the secondary mortgage market through
the Federal National Mortgage Association, which was established in the 1930s to purchase
FHA insured mortgages and which more recently has purchased conventional mortgages
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D. Summary
In sum, the threat of rent control, increases in liquidity among apart-
ment dwellers, and the advent of mortgage insurance may all have helped
to reduce the cost of owner-occupied vis-A-vis rented apartments in re-
cent decades. The nature and timing of each of these developments, how-
ever, provides reason to believe that none of them has had more than a
modest effect in this respect.
VI. ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION
Another possible explanation for the recent spread of condominiums
is that the condominium form, when first introduced to American law in
the early 1960s, constituted an organizational innovation that reduced the
cost of owner-occupancy in multiunit dwellings significantly below that
afforded by cooperatives and thus made owner-occupancy efficient for a
much larger segment of the apartment market than it had been previously.
This explanation, which we can label the "organizational innovation
theory," has some plausibility. By minimizing the common-property ele-
ment in ownership and leaving each occupant to seek separate financing
for her individual unit, a condominium, in contrast to a cooperative,
reduces the extent to which the occupants of a building must serve as
sureties for each other. Consequently, a condominium has better risk-
sharing properties than a cooperative and is also less prone to the pros-
pect that default by some of the building's occupants will lead to default
and dislocation for the rest owing to the latter's limited liquidity. More-
over, in a cooperative as opposed to a condominium a member is (or was
until recently) constrained to the same level of debt financing as the other
members. If the collective mortgage represents only 40 percent of the
current market value of the building, then a new tenant can in effect
borrow no more or less than 40 percent of the cost of purchasing her
unit.8 0
On the other hand, occupants of a cooperative benefit from the savings
that result from having only one large mortgage on a building rather than
the many individual ones that must each be renegotiated each time a
condominium unit changes hands. Furthermore, members of a coopera-
as well. Id. The Federal National Mortgage Association includes mortgages on cooperative
and condominium housing among those it will purchase. But this program, too, is largely
unsubsidized and, presumably, has at most indirect effects on the availability of credit for
owner-occupied apartments.
0 This constraint has been relaxed recently as banks have begun to make personal loans
secured by an individual tenant's shares of stock in a cooperative apartment building.
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tive may be less prone than members of a condominium to opportunistic
default owing to their sense of obligation to their fellow tenants.
Consequently, it is not clear a priori that condominiums are markedly
more efficient than cooperatives. Moreover, the process by which the
condominium form has spread raises three objections to the organiza-
tional innovation theory.
A. Why Was the Condominium Form Not Adopted Earlier?
The condominium form is an import from Europe, where it has been
known for centuries.8 If condominiums are significantly more efficient
than cooperatives, then why was the form not imported to the United
States much earlier than the 1960s?
There may be a response to this objection. Arguably it is only re-
cently-since the 1930s-that the European states have adopted condo-
minium statutes that provide an adequate model for importation to the
United States.82 Consequently, modern enabling statutes for condomini-
ums may have come to the United States .not much later than they did
to Europe, constituting a more or less simultaneous legal innovation on
the two continents. In any event, we know too little about the mechanics
of legal transfers to infer that, simply because a legal form was slow in
crossing the Atlantic, it did not represent an important improvement in
efficiency.
The actual circumstances surrounding the enactment of condominium
statutes in the United States shed little further light on this issue. In fact,
the statutes were not directly imported from Europe but came to the
mainland United States by a slow and circuitous path that led through
Latin America and Puerto Rico and that appears to have been largely
fortuitous. The critical event that stimulated the adoption of condomin-
51 It is interesting, and relevant for present purposes, to ask why the condominium form
came to be employed in Europe earlier than it did in the United States. The answer to this
question for the nineteenth century and before is unclear. It seems, however, that the great
boom in condominium development in Europe came only after the First World War and
was in considerable part a response to the rent controls that began to be widely adopted in
Europe at that time. J. Leyser, Ownership of Flats-a Comparative Study of Flats, Int'l &
Comp. L. Q. 31, 32 (1958); Terence Burke et al., Condominium: Housing for Tomorrow 7
(1964).
12 For example, in France, where condominiums had been known since the Middle Ages
and recognized to some degree by statute since the Code Napoleon of 1804, it was not until
1938 that legislation was enacted that specified in any detail the rights and obligations of
the unit owners. The first modem condominium statute was adopted in Belgium in 1924;
Italy and Spain, like France, adopted their modem condominium legislation in the 1930s,
while Germany and the Netherlands did not do so until the 1950s. L. Neville Brown, French
Co-property Apartments: A Model for English Law? 110 Solic. J. 591 (1966); Leyser, supra
note 8, at 35; Ferrer & Stecher, supra note 8, at 14-40.
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ium statutes by the American states-namely the extension of FHA mort-
gage insurance to condominium units in 1961-was a response to lobby-
ing by interests in Puerto Rico, which had long had the condominium
form; it was not actively supported by housing developers, financers,
or consumers in the continental United States, thus suggesting that the
condominium form was not then perceived by the real estate community
as offering important efficiency advantages-although this might, of
course, have simply reflected their inexperience with the form.83 (It is,
incidentally, clear that American legal scholarship played no important
role in the condominium innovation; there appear to be no articles in U.S.
legal periodicals dealing with condominiums between 1930 and 1960.)
B. Why the Lag in Condominium Development?
A second objection to the organizational innovation theory is, If the
condominium form constituted a conspicuous reduction in the cost of
owner-occupancy for apartments, why did a decade elapse between the
adoption of condominium statutes and the time when condominiums be-
gan to be developed in substantial numbers? This delay suggests that
the efficiency advantages of condominiums over cooperatives may be
relatively modest and that it was not until the 1970s, when the tax subsidy
to owner-occupied apartments became exceptionally large, that wide-
spread development of either cooperatives or condominiums became
worthwhile. Then, owner-occupied apartments having finally become re-
munerative for a significant portion of the market, the condominium
83 A condominium enabling act had been adopted in Puerto Rico as early as 1901 and
revised in 1951; it was not until 1958, however, that a truly workable statute was fashioned.
P.R. Civ. Code § 403 (1902); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1275 (1954); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 1291 et seq. (1958). The Puerto Rican statutes were patterned after those adopted in
various Latin American countries, which in turn were influenced by the European, and
particularly the Spanish, condominium statutes. See Ferrer & Stecher, supra note 8, at 5 I.
(The 1958 statute, in particular, was modeled after an earlier Cuban act. W. Robert Folkes,
Legal and Practical Aspects of Condominiums, 19 Bus. Law. 233 (1963).) Then, evidently
influenced by lobbying from Puerto Rican banking and real estate interests, who were
seeking to improve financing for the condominium housing that was already being developed
in Puerto Rico, Congress in 1961 approved FHA insured mortgages for condominiums; to
implement this, the FHA promulgated a model condominium act that essentially followed
the Puerto Rican statute. See U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings on General Housing
Legislation before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and
Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 246-74 (1960); Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing
Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association? 117 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1104,
1110 (1969). Within a few years, most states proceeded to adopt a condominium statute
based on the FHA model, though perhaps in considerable part only because this was a
costless measure that might make state residents eligible for additional federal mortgage
insurance and thus gave the appearance of addressing housing problems.
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rather than the cooperative form was generally chosen because of the
two it was marginally-but only marginally-more efficient.
But this objection, too, is not decisive. Even industrial process innova-
tions, whose diffusion rates have been widely studied, commonly exhibit
a lag of some years between introduction and widespread adoption. 4 And
an organizational innovation such as condominium housing, in contrast
to industrial process innovations, requires not only that producers (in
this case, developers) come to understand the advantages of the new
form and the means of implementing it, but that lenders, brokers, and
consumers also come to understand and trust it. Consumers, in particu-
lar, must come to believe that there will be a resale market for their units,
which requires a substantial act of faith before that market has actually
developed. A delay of a decade between the appearance of the innovation
and its widespread adoption is therefore not necessarily evidence that the
innovation did not represent a significant reduction in costs.
C. Why So Many Cooperatives in New York City?
The third and most telling objection to the organizational innovation
theory is that in New York City there are still nearly five times as many
cooperative units as there are condominium units; 85 moreover, new coop-
eratives continue to be formed in New York City, through new construc-
tion and (primarily) conversion, in significantly larger numbers than con-
dominiums. 6 Presumably an important explanation for this is that New
York consumers, lawyers, lenders, and real estate agents accumulated
substantial experience with cooperatives through their relatively exten-
sive development there-evidently as a response to rent control-be-
tween 1945 and 1965. This experience, which was lacking in other juris-
dictions, apparently gave cooperatives a continuing transaction cost
84 See Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation (1968); Lars
Nasbeth and George F. Ray, The Diffusion of New Industrial Processes (1974); Stephen
Davies, The Diffusion of Process Innovations (1979).
85 As of 1986 there were 57,000 condominium units in New York City (28,000 from
conversion and 29,000 from new construction) and 246,000 cooperative units (117,000 from
conversion and 19,000 from new construction). The latter figures exclude an additional
83,000 cooperative units that receive public subsidies under various programs. New York
State Dep't of Public Service, Office of Energy Conservation and Environmental Planning,
New York City Housing Market (April 1986).
86 In 1987 there were a total of 35,619 cooperative units created (34,450 through conver-
sion and 1,169 through new construction) in contrast to 9,479 condominium units (2,188
through conversion and 7,291 through new construction). Id. There are evidently no special
regulatory restrictions in New York City on the conversion of rental units to the condomin-
ium rather than the cooperative form that would in themselves account for the dispropor-
tionately large number of cooperative units formed there through conversion. Interview
with Gary Glatter, associate general counsel, M. J. Raines Company (May 15, 1989).
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advantage over condominiums even after the latter form became avail-
able. If condominiums were significantly more efficient than cooperatives
as an organizational form, it seems unlikely that such familiarity would
in itself have been sufficient to cause cooperatives to continue to domi-
nate the market for a quarter of a century after condominiums became
available. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, as discussed
below, in New York City cooperatives and condominiums have appeared
in roughly equal numbers among commercial buildings even though
nearly all of them were formed since 1978, by which time the condomin-
ium form was quite well established in the New York residential market.
If condominiums were significantly more efficient than cooperatives,
one would have expected only condominiums among these commercial
buildings.
These developments in New York City suggest that it is quite possible
that, had condominium statutes never been adopted in the United States,
many of the buildings organized as condominiums in the past two de-
cades, not only in New York but throughout the country, would have
been organized as cooperatives instead and that the total market share
of owner-occupied apartments would still have grown roughly as it did.
VII. COMMERCIAL CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES
Even more persuasive evidence that the recent spread of cooperatives
and condominiums is primarily a response to tax incentives, and not to
other developments such as those just surveyed, comes from the remark-
able paucity of commercial buildings organized as cooperatives or condo-
miniums.
A. The Absence of Commercial Development
Twenty years ago, when condominiums were still new, it was widely
thought that they would see their greatest growth in the commercial sec-
tor.87 Yet this has not occurred. Commercial cooperatives and condomini-
ums remain a rarity; multiunit commercial buildings are still almost uni-
versally organized on a rental basis.88 In New York City, for example,
despite the extensive development of both cooperatives and condomini-
87 1 Rohan & Reskin, supra note 43, at 3.
' It was estimated in 1981 that there were then only 400-600 commercial condominiums
in the United States. Outlook for Commercial Industrial Condominiums, Mortgage & Real
Est. Executives Rep., April 1, 1981, at 5, cited in Note, Commercial Condominiums: Statu-
tory Roadblocks to Development, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 432, 433 n. 8 (1982). (Despite the title
of the latter article, there seem to be no significant statutory obstacles to the formation of
office condominiums in most states.)
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urns in the residential sector, there was evidently only one office building
organized as a condominium before 1978, and there were none organized
as cooperatives. Since then, the rate of formation (primarily through con-
version) of office cooperatives and condominiums has increased; never-
theless, as of December 1984 there were still only sixty such buildings in
New York City in total, divided roughly equally between cooperatives
and condominiums.8 9 And this was true despite the fact that office cooper-
atives and condominiums escape New York City's commercial rent tax.'
So long as everyone is in the same tax bracket, the International Reve-
nue Code is essentially neutral between owner-occupancy and rental in
commercial buildings, in contrast to the previously described situation
with residential buildings. On the other hand, there is some tax bias when
tax brackets differ between occupants and potential landlords. For those
years in which depreciation deductions have substantially exceeded eco-
nomic depreciation, it has been advantageous to have a commercial build-
ing owned by someone who is in a high tax bracket and who can therefore
take advantage of the large depreciation deductions to shelter other in-
come that would otherwise be taxed at a high marginal rate. Occupants
in low tax brackets have therefore had an incentive to lease rather than
own.
An estimate of the magnitude of this incentive can be derived from
Table 6, part A. In 1976, for example, there was a potential annual tax
saving of 1.2 percent of the building's value if an occupant in a tax bracket
corresponding to the fortieth percentile in the income distribution decided
not to own but rather to rent from a landlord in the ninety-fifth percentile,
and 4.6 percent if the landlord was in the top tax bracket. Evidently
cooperative and condominium ownership has insufficient efficiency ad-
vantages over rental, if any, to overcome such a subsidy.
Many commercial tenants occupy their space for relatively long periods
of time, so that the transaction costs of moving are presumably not a
more important consideration for them than for the typical owner of a
residential cooperative or condominium. Moreover, businesses seem
likely, on average, to have as much or more need than households to
modify the space they occupy to suit their special requirements. For
example, shops frequently remodel their display space elaborately, and
even law firms and other consumers of office space commonly move
walls, install paneling, or reconfigure utilities to meet their individual
needs. Likewise, businesses seem as well suited as households to bear
9 Golda Housman, Office Condominiums and Cooperatives: Manhattan's Underground
Success Story, 15 Real Est. Rev. 71 (Fall 1985).
90 Id.
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the risks associated with ownership-perhaps rather better suited, on
average. Nor is it apparent that businesses suffer from greater liquidity
problems than do households. In short, tax considerations aside, there
seems as much or more incentive for businesses to own the space they
occupy in multiunit commercial buildings as there is for apartment dwell-
ers to own their apartments.
Like households, businesses frequently own the building they occupy
if they are the sole occupant. This suggests that the lack of commercial
cooperatives and condominiums may be attributable in substantial part
to the costs of collective governance where interests are heterogeneous.
Further evidence of this comes from observing the types of situations in
which commercial condominiums typically arise. Doctors' offices seem
to be among the most common.9 ' One reason for this is presumably that
doctors are frequently in high tax brackets and thus can make good use
of the tax shelter advantages of owning commercial real estate. But an-
other may be that doctors have relatively homogeneous interests when it
comes to renting office space, so that serious conflict in decision making
is relatively infrequent. Other types of commercial tenants, in contrast,
can be quite heterogeneous in their needs 92 and in general are probably
more so than residential tenants.
B. Tax Forms versus Contractual Forms
For tenure choice in residential versus commercial buildings, the diver-
gent incentives created by tax law run counter to the underlying contrac-
tual logic. In residential apartment buildings, tax subsidies strongly en-
courage owner-occupancy although, in general, rental is probably the
more efficient contractual regime. Conversely, in multiunit commercial
buildings the tax law has (at least until 1986) favored rental, although the
need of many commercial tenants to customize their space suggests that
a regime with many of the attributes of occupant ownership might often
be advantageous.
Not surprisingly, the contractual arrangements employed in residential
and commercial settings have adjusted accordingly. In condominiums,
there appears to be an increasing trend toward delegation of management
to hired management companies; the range of decisions that condomin-
ium boards reserve for themselves has been shrinking, presumably to
9' See, for example, Rohan & Reskin, supra note 43, at 3.
92 For example, some tenants may wish to expand their space into that currently occupied
by other tenants, or some tenants may wish the building to be open, heated, and attended
at night while others do not.
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reduce the costs associated with collective decision making.9 3 This move
toward a single decision maker whose interests are in some respects at
odds with those of the residents mimics rental to a degree, while maintain-
ing the nominal form of owner-occupancy for tax purposes. 94
Conversely, commercial leases often have many of the attributes of
ownership. They are commonly written for relatively long terms (such as
ten years), leave the tenant bearing virtually all the costs of maintaining
and remodeling his space, and pass through to him all utility and service
charges. The owner of the building frequently agrees to do little more
than maintain the shell of the building and, even for this service, com-
monly takes a rental fee that is indexed for inflation. Thus commercial
buildings achieve many of the characteristics of condominiums while re-
taining the nominal form of a leasehold with its tax benefits.95
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY AND POLICY
The evidence assembled above does not suffice to provide an unambig-
uous explanation for the rapid spread of cooperative and condominium
housing in the past two decades. The two factors that appear most impor-
tant are tax subsidies and organizational innovation. But the relative im-
portance of these two factors is unclear. Although the boom in coopera-
tives and condominiums was preceded by the advent of large net tax
subsidies to owner-occupied housing, the sudden surge in cooperatives
and, particularly, condominiums in the mid-1970s is difficult to explain
on the basis of taxes alone. And, while the latter development might seem
to be explained by the adoption of condominium statutes in the early
1960s, the continuing vitality of the cooperative form in New York City,
and the failure of condominiums to achieve much popularity in commer-
cial buildings, both throw some doubt on the significance of the condo-
minium form as a cost-reducing organizational innovation.
93 In the 1920s there was a similar and apparently successful development involving
cooperatives under which, to maintain competent management and avoid tenant disagree-
ments, control of many cooperative buildings was placed in the hands of a self-perpetuating
board of trustees. Twentieth Century Fund, supra note 3, at 234-35.
9 This process of cost reduction will undoubtedly continue. For example, one can imag-
ine that the transaction costs of transferring ownership in condominiums could be reduced
to the point where they do not appreciably exceed the costs involved in replacing one tenant
with another in a rental building. This might be accomplished by having a single bank
contract to provide all the mortgage financing for units in a given condominium and work
closely with the management company for that building in handling both financing and
transfers of title, so that together they would perform some of the role of the conventional
landlord who is responsible himself for "lending" all the units in his building to the tenants
he selects and repossessing the units in case of nonpayment.
9 Similar tax considerations presumably help explain why leasing of automobiles is com-
mon among businesses but rare among individuals.
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One reasonable overall interpretation of the data might be as follows:
For all but a small fraction of the occupants of multiunit housing, neither
the cooperative nor the condominium form would be competitive with
rental in the absence of a tax subsidy. The condominium form, however,
is somewhat more efficient than the cooperative form and requires a
smaller subsidy to make it competitive with rental. By the mid-1950s,
the net tax subsidy to owner-occupancy was sufficiently large to make
cooperative housing less expensive than rental for a substantial segment
of the population, and this is reflected in the gradually increasing share
of the multiunit housing market represented by cooperatives in the 1950s
and 1960s. Then, in the early 1960s, the condominium form was made
available in the United States, largely fortuitously, though perhaps also in
part as a response to the stronger demand for owner-occupied apartments
generated by the tax subsidy. It subsequently took nearly a decade-until
the early 1970s-to accumulate sufficient experience with the condomin-
ium form to make it acceptable to a broad segment of the market. After
that, however, the existing tax subsidy sufficed to induce condominiums
to spread rapidly through the housing market.
If this interpretation is roughly correct, it follows that, without a tax
subsidy, cooperatives and condominiums might compete poorly with
rental in the market for residential apartments and, at least outside of
jurisdictions with rent control, might today have a relatively insignificant
market share.' This means, in turn, that the tax subsidy to owner-occu-
pied housing may induce substantial inefficiency in the organization of
apartment buildings and that a significant fraction of the value of the
subsidy may be lost to this inefficiency.
Figure 3 provides an illustration. The vertical axis measures the cost
of occupying a given apartment, including transaction costs. The horizon-
tal axis measures the position in the wealth distribution of a given class
of households that are otherwise similar in characteristics pertinent to
their demand for owner-occupancy versus rental, such as their transiency
and their taste for making idiosyncratic alterations in their apartment.
9 A substantial fraction of all condominium units (as of 1980, 23 percent) are not occupied
by their owners but, rather, are rented out. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of
Housing, General Housing Characteristics, United States Summary, ser. HC80-1-AI, table
5. (The reported figures may be misleadingly high, however, because they contain many
intrafamily transactions.) This is puzzling in light of the considerations reviewed here. Such
an arrangement might seem to get the worst of both worlds: the relatively disadvantageous
tax treatment of rental and the collective governance problems of owner-occupancy. It may
be, however, that the costs of collective governance are largely avoided by absentee unit
owners, who free ride on the efforts of the residents in this regard. Moreover, for many
individuals with extra funds to invest, this may have been an easy way to take advantage
of the real estate tax shelter, and one lacking the agency problems of a limited partnership.
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FIGURE 3.-Efficiency and equity consequences of net tax subsidy to owner occupancy
The horizontal line labeled R I gives the cost to such households of renting
the apartment in the absence of taxes-a cost that is shown here, as
seems roughly reasonable, to be invariant with respect to the household's
wealth. The line labeled R 2 gives the (private) cost of renting the same
unit with the subsidy provided to landlords by the real estate tax shelter.
(Since 1986, R, and R 2 would be roughly the same.) The line labeled 0
gives the cost of occupying the apartment as an owner-occupant in the
absence of taxes; this is assumed to be lower for wealthier households
since the latter will (among other things) be less affected by illiquidity
and risk. The line labeled 02, in turn, gives the (private) cost of owner-
occupancy after taxes. The gap between 0 and 02 is larger for wealthier
households because the exclusion of imputed rental income is more valu-
able for households in higher tax brackets.
In the absence of taxes, only households higher in the wealth distribu-
tion than WN would choose ownership (through a cooperative or condo-
minium); all others would rent. With taxes, however, all households
higher in the wealth distribution than WT would choose to own. The total
cost of the net tax subsidy to owner-occupancy vis-A-vis rental here is
therefore the sum of the areas A, C, and E. Area A is the efficiency loss
from inducing ownership by households for which the social cost of rental
is lower, while areas C and E together represent a pure transfer to house-
holds that own rather than rent. The efficiency loss represented by area
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A provides another argument-beyond the familiar charges of (a) ineq-
uity and (b) encouragement of excessive overall investment in hous-
ingaT-for taxing the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing or
otherwise eliminating the disparity in taxation between rental and owner-
ship.98 The magnitude of this efficiency loss depends on the tax bracket
of the marginal landlord and of the marginal tenant (that is, the tenant
who is just indifferent between renting and owning, with wealth WT in
Figure 3). If, for example, the marginal landlord is in the sixtieth percen-
tile or higher and the marginal tenant is between the twentieth and the
fiftieth income percentile, then, for 1988, according to Table 7, part A,
the efficiency loss from inducing such a marginal tenant to own rather
than rent an apartment is 1.44 percent of the capital cost of the apartment
annually, or 16 percent of the cost of rental (which roughly approximates
the cost of capital for 1988 since the tax subsidy to rental is essentially
gone). If the marginal tenant is in the sixtieth percentile or higher, the
efficiency loss is 3.18 percent of the capital cost annually, or 38 percent
of the cost of rental. These figures establish an upper bound on the effi-
ciency cost of the subsidy; as Figure 3 shows, inframarginal (wealthier)
tenants will experience less inefficiency from owning rather than renting.
IX. CONCLUSION
The rapid spread of cooperative and condominium housing over the
past three decades offers a striking study in the evolution of legal forms.
This development appears to be in part a consequence of organizational
innovation and in part a response to tax subsidies. Although it is difficult
to sort out the respective contributions of these two factors, the available
evidence suggests that tax subsidies may have been more important. In
most circumstances, cooperative and condominium housing are evidently
less efficient forms of tenure than rental. Without the large tax subsidies
of recent decades, cooperative and condominium apartments might well
have remained confined principally to jurisdictions with rent control.
Several factors contribute to the costliness of owner-occupancy versus
rental in multiunit housing, including illiquidity, poor diversification of
risk, and high transaction costs of changing residences. Among the more
important of these factors, however, is apparently one that is seldom
remarked on, namely the costs of collective governance. Although these
costs are low for housing as compared to other consumer goods and
services-which helps explain why housing is one of very few nonfinan-
97 Yet another argument against the relative subsidy to owner-occupancy is that it encour-
ages underdiversification of investments.
9 For other means of eliminating the disparity, see note 39 supra.
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cial industries in which consumer cooperatives are common9-neverthe-
less they are evidently sufficiently high to have a significant effect on the
market for cooperatives and condominiums.
99 Others are electricity distribution, telephone service, and book retailing. The statement
in the text refers to firms owned by individual consumers; consumer cooperatives are far
more common among wholesale and supply firms, where the members are the retail firms
or producers to whom they sell. See Hansmann, supra note 10.

